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I. INTRODUCTION 
Golan v. Holder1 presents the question of whether Congress was 
constitutionally permitted to pass Section 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act,2 a statute that “restored” copyright protection to 
foreign works that had been free for public use for decades.3 The 
Copyright Clause gives Congress the authority to create limited 
monopolies in original works of authorship.4 As with all congressional 
powers, however, the copyright power has its limits.5 These limits are 
particularly important because copyright grants authors the exclusive 
right to copy, distribute, and adapt their works, potentially denying the 
public access to the “building blocks of future creativity.”6 Because the 
public domain is restricted with each additional protection that 
copyright provides, Congress must carefully balance the interests of 
the American public with those of copyright holders in determining 
the scope and duration of copyright protection.7 Over time, Congress 
has shifted the balance increasingly in favor of copyright holders.8 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. argued Oct. 5, 2011). 
 2. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994). 
 3. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 14, 2011). 
 4. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). Congress may only grant copyright to 
original works. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 346 (“Originality is a constitutional 
requirement.”). In addition, Congress may not grant perpetual copyrights. See Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209–10 (2003) (discussing the limited times constraint). Nor may it grant 
copyright to ideas or disallow fair use without violating the First Amendment. See id. at 219–21 
(declaring that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense make copyright compatible 
with the First Amendment). 
 6. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 3–4.   
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200–01 (discussing two prior copyright term extensions in the 
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Until now, courts have generally allowed it to do so.9 
In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court will determine whether 
the Copyright Clause,10 or alternatively, the First Amendment, 
prohibits Congress from restoring copyright to works in the public 
domain. Golan v. Holder thus presents the Court with the opportunity 
to place meaningful limits on the legislative expansion of copyright. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In April 1994, the United States signed the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) as part of 
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.11 
Among other things, the TRIPs agreement required that signatories 
comply with Article 18 of the Berne Convention.12 Article 18 of the 
Berne Convention13 requires the restoration of copyright to certain 
foreign works that were previously in the public domain, but allows 
each member nation to decide how to implement this requirement.14 
Pursuant to Article 18, foreign works that lost protection due to an 
author’s failure to comply with registration, notice, or renewal 
formalities must be restored to copyright.15 The TRIPs agreement also 
provides for compulsory dispute resolution before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). A finding of noncompliance by the WTO could 
lead to trade sanctions against the noncompliant state party.16 
 
context of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), a third statute extending copyright 
protection); see also United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute, which prohibited the recording 
of live performances despite the fact that live performances are not fixed in a tangible medium); 
United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding the anti-bootlegging 
statute constitutional, despite lack of compliance with the fixation and limited times 
requirements). 
 9. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194 (finding the CTEA constitutional); see also Moghadam, 175 
F.3d at 1282 (finding the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional); Martignon, 492 F.3d at 153 
(finding the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional). 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 11. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 12. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Mar. 1, 1989, 331 
U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 14. Id. at 251. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Brief for the Respondents at 4, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2011). It 
seems as though some countries take the threat of trade sanctions quite seriously. For example, 
the first TRIPs case the United States submitted to the WTO alleged that Japan’s copyright 
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Pursuant to the TRIPs agreement, Congress enacted the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA). Congress designed its 
implementing legislation with the hope that other member nations 
would reciprocate by providing the same protections to American 
authors in their countries that the United States provided to foreign 
authors through the URAA.17 Section 514 of the URAA restores 
copyright protection to foreign works that have become part of the 
public domain for any of the following reasons: (i) failure to comply 
with U.S. registration formalities, (ii) lack of subject matter protection 
for sound recordings, or (iii) lack of national eligibility.18 These foreign 
works receive copyright protection for the remainder of the copyright 
term they would have received in the United States had they never 
entered the public domain.19 The URAA has no equivalent provisions 
for works created by American authors, to whom it provides no direct 
benefits.20 
Section 514 has the potential to severely limit the American 
public’s right to use millions of foreign works.21 It provides some 
temporary protection, however, for reliance parties, persons who 
invested in the use of the works while they were in the public 
domain.22 Foreign copyright holders who wish to enforce their 
restored copyrights must either (i) provide a general notice through 
the Copyright Office within two years of the date of restoration or (ii) 
send notice directly to the reliance party.23 After the notice 
 
regime was noncompliant because the term of protection that applied to retroactively granted 
foreign sound recording copyrights was too short. Japan eventually agreed to amend its 
copyright law. Elizabeth T. Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the Golan 
Battle Within the Tenth Circuit, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 131, 152–53 (2011). The United States, 
however, does not seem to take the trade sanctions as seriously. Although the WTO’s dispute 
settlement body has found the United States in violation of the TRIPs agreement due to 
exceptions that allow restaurants and bars to play music and television under certain 
circumstances without paying royalty fees, the United States has not changed its copyright laws. 
Instead, it pays a yearly fine for the violation. Elizabeth T. Gard, In the Trenches with § 104A: 
An Evaluation of the Parties’ Arguments in Golan v. Holder as it Heads to the Supreme Court, 64 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 199, 205 (2011). 
 17. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 52. 
 18. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994). 
 19. Id. In the United States, the copyright term is the life of the author plus seventy years. 
If the work is a work-for-hire, the copyright term lasts for ninety-five years after publication. 17 
U.S.C.A. § 302 (1998). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Marybeth Peters, The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. 
Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 31 (1996). 
 22. 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (providing temporary protection for parties that relied on foreign 
works by making copies of them for distribution or by making derivative works).  
 23. Id. 
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requirement is satisfied, reliance parties have a one-year grace period 
during which they may continue selling copies of the work that were 
made prior to the notice of restoration.24 In addition, reliance parties 
who created derivative works prior to restoration may continue to 
exploit those derivative works if they pay “reasonable compensation” 
to the owners of the restored copyrights.25 
In Golan v. Holder, Petitioners sold, performed, distributed, and 
otherwise relied on foreign works in the public domain for their 
livelihoods.26 They often chose works specifically because they were in 
the public domain and would not require payment of licensing fees, 
which Petitioners found to be cost-prohibitive.27 Section 514 restored 
those works to copyright protection, requiring Petitioners to pay 
licensing fees if they chose to continue using them.28 
Petitioners filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 
514, arguing that its provisions exceeded the authority granted to 
Congress in the Copyright Clause and required First Amendment 
scrutiny.29 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
Government on both issues.30 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding on the Copyright Clause, 
but held that Section 514 was subject to First Amendment scrutiny 
and remanded the case to the district court to apply the appropriate 
analysis.31 On remand, the district court applied intermediate scrutiny 
and concluded that Section 514 was unconstitutionally overbroad.32 
On appeal for the second time, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held 
that Section 514 was constitutional.33 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioners in Golan v. Holder argue that Section 514 of the 
URAA runs afoul of two constitutional limitations on congressional 
power: the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[p]laintiffs are 
orchestra conductors, educators, performers, publishers, film archivists, and motion picture 
distributors” who “perform, distribute, and sell public domain works”). 
 27. Id. at 1082. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. (discussing the procedural history of the case). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 32. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 33. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1084, 1094. 
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A. The Copyright Clause 
While the Copyright Clause grants Congress the authority to 
protect artistic works, this power comes with certain constraints.34 The 
Copyright Clause states that “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”35 This language implies a 
number of limitations.36 For example, the preamble of the Clause, 
requiring Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,” is the textual root for the utilitarian theory of copyright law, 
which the Court has espoused for many years.37 Based on this view of 
copyright, its immediate effect is to incentivize authors to create new 
works by guaranteeing them the exclusive right to reap the economic 
benefits of that work. Providing incentives to authors is not the 
ultimate goal, however, but a means to a more important end: the 
enrichment of the public domain.38 The requirement that copyrights 
be granted for “limited Times” serves to achieve that goal. After 
copyright expires and the work enters the public domain, any member 
of the general public is free to use the work in any way he sees fit.39 
Through several recent legislative enactments, Congress has 
considerably expanded copyright protections, and the courts have 
proved reluctant to defend the public domain against that expansion.40 
One such legislative enactment is the Copyright Term Extension Act 
(CTEA),41 which lengthened the term of copyright protection for both 
 
 34. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(explaining that the “economic philosophy” behind copyright is that securing a “fair return” for 
authors’ labor is the best way to achieve the ultimate aim of serving the public good); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating that the primary objective 
of copyright is to promote the progress of knowledge). 
 38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 39. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003).  
 40. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2003) (characterizing the petitioners’ 
claims as “assert[ing] the right to make other people’s speeches” and stating that “the Copyright 
Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that . . . will serve the 
ends of the Clause. . . . The wisdom of Congress’ action . . . is not within our province to second-
guess”); see also United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding 
the anti-bootlegging statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause, despite evidence that 
Congress believed it was acting under the Copyright authority and despite lack of compliance 
with the fixation and “limited Times” requirements); United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 
141–42 (2d Cir. 2007) (same). 
 41. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 
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future and existing works by twenty years.42 Its constitutionality was 
soon challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft.43 
The petitioners in Eldred argued that the CTEA violated the 
“limited Times” constraint44 and that granting copyright to existing 
works could not possibly “promote the Progress of Science” because 
authors did not need further incentive to create works that already 
existed.45 The Supreme Court disagreed.46 The Court was unconvinced 
by the petitioners’ argument that legitimizing this practice would 
allow Congress to circumvent the “limited Times” requirement by 
creating perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions.47 Instead, 
the Court declared that “limited” did not mean “fixed” or 
“inalterable” and found that copyrights under the CTEA would still 
be limited by a specific expiration date.48 Because Congress had 
extended the copyright term many times before and had applied each 
new term to both future and existing works—and because past courts 
had never objected—the Court found that Congress could continue 
that practice.49 The Court believed that Congress deserved substantial 
deference in the realm of copyright because it was not the judiciary’s 
role to alter the delicate balance Congress strove to achieve through 
its copyright policy.50 As a result, the Court upheld the CTEA. 
B. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment forbids Congress from making any law that 
abridges the freedom of speech or expression.51 The right to free 
speech, however, is not absolute. Although content-based regulations 
of expression are subject to strict scrutiny,52 Congress has considerably 
more leeway in passing laws that are content-neutral, which are only 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.53 In determining whether a regulation 
 
2827 (amending 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302, 304).  
 42. CTEA §§ 102(b), (d). 
 43. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 211–12. 
 46. Id. at 199. 
 47. Id. at 208. 
 48. Id. at 199. 
 49. Id. at 202–04. 
 50. Id. at 204–05. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 52. Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the speech-restricting law 
furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
 53. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
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is content-based or content-neutral, the primary consideration is 
whether Congress enacted the regulation because of disagreement 
with the content of the speech.54 If a statute is determined to be 
content-neutral, to withstand intermediate scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, it must “advance[] important governmental interests . . . 
and [must] not burden substantially more speech than necessary to 
further those interests.”55 
In Eldred, the petitioners argued that the CTEA was a content-
neutral regulation of speech that failed intermediate scrutiny.56 The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because the Copyright Clause 
and the First Amendment were adopted close in time, copyright 
generally will be compatible with free speech principles.57 In fact, the 
Court declared that copyright is an “engine of free expression” 
because its purpose is to promote the creation and publication of 
ideas.58 In addition, copyright contains inherent First Amendment 
protections such as the idea/expression dichotomy and an exception 
for fair use.59 Thus, the Court held that unless Congress “altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection,” First Amendment 
scrutiny of copyright laws was unnecessary.60 
IV. HOLDING 
In Golan v. Gonzales61 and Golan v. Holder,62 the cases giving rise 
to this litigation, the Tenth Circuit held that Section 514 did not 
exceed Congress’s copyright authority63 and did not violate the First 
Amendment.64 
In Golan v. Gonzalez, the Tenth Circuit disposed of Petitioners’ 
challenge under the Copyright Clause by following Eldred. It deferred 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). 
 56. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003). 
 57. Id. at 219. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 219–20 (explaining that the idea/expression dichotomy, which distinguishes 
between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas, and fair use, which affords the 
public certain privileged uses of copyrighted work, are “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations”). 
 60. Id. at 221. 
 61. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 62. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 63. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1197 (holding that Section 514 does not exceed 
Congress’s copyright authority). 
 64. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1094 (holding that Section 514 is consistent with the First 
Amendment). 
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to congressional judgment on the scope of copyright protection, 
holding that as long as Congress exercises its authority rationally and 
in a manner related to the goals of the Copyright Clause, courts 
cannot intervene.65 Because Congress had passed Section 514 to 
protect the rights of American authors abroad, the court found that 
Congress had not exceeded its Copyright Clause authority.66 
The Tenth Circuit seemed more conflicted, however, about 
Petitioners’ First Amendment challenge. In Golan v. Gonzales, the 
court sought to determine what features of copyright represented its 
“traditional contours”67 under Eldred. The court held that the term 
“traditional” made reference to the historical treatment of copyright.68 
Because every statutory scheme prior to Section 514 had preserved 
the same three-step sequence—from creation, to copyright, to the 
public domain—it found that one of the “traditional contours” of 
copyright was that works that entered the public domain remained 
there.69 By removing works from the public domain, Section 514 
violated this “time-honored tradition.”70 The idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use defense could not alleviate the harm done to 
Petitioners because unlike the works’ presence in the public domain, 
these measures do not allow for completely unrestricted use of the 
works.71 As a result, the court held that in passing Section 514, 
Congress altered the traditional contours of copyright.72 The Tenth 
Circuit remanded the case so the district court could apply a First 
Amendment analysis.73 On remand, the parties stipulated that Section 
514 was a content-neutral regulation of speech.74 The district court 
applied intermediate scrutiny and found the statute unconstitutional.75 
A year later, the Tenth Circuit reversed this ruling in Golan v. 
Holder, holding that Section 514 passed intermediate scrutiny.76 The 
court found that a substantial government interest existed because 
 
 65. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187. 
 66. Id. at 1186–87. 
 67. The Supreme Court was never explicit about what it meant by the “traditional 
contours” of copyright, except that they included the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
defense. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003). 
 68. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1188–89. 
 69. Id. at 1189. 
 70. Id. at 1192. 
 71. Id. at 1194–95. 
 72. Id. at 1192. 
 73. Id. at 1197. 
 74. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1080. 
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certain foreign countries’ refusal to grant copyright to American 
works harmed the expressive and economic interests of American 
authors.77 The court’s analysis relied heavily on industry testimony 
heard during the URAA congressional hearings. The testimony stated 
that Section 514’s retroactive grant of copyright protection to foreign 
works would encourage other countries to enact similar legislation, 
thereby resulting in preservation of the rights of American copyright 
holders.78 
In determining whether Congress had sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Section 514 would alleviate a real harm, the court 
focused on the deference it owed Congress on this issue.79 The court 
was obliged to show substantial deference to Congress’s predictive 
judgments not only because of Congress’s greater ability to “evaluate 
the vast amounts of data bearing upon . . . legislative questions” and 
“its authority to exercise the legislative power,” but also because 
Section 514 relates to foreign affairs.80 
The court then determined that Section 514 did not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary because the burdens 
imposed on Petitioners were congruent with the benefits given to 
American authors.81 That other countries had chosen different 
structures for similar regulations was irrelevant because narrow 
tailoring does not require Congress to reach its end through the least-
restrictive means.82 As a result, the court held that Section 514 did not 
violate the First Amendment.83 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (i) whether 
the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress from taking works out of the 
public domain, and (ii) whether Section 514 violates the First 
Amendment.84 
 
 77. Id. at 1084. 
 78. Id. at 1087–88. The Government argues that this prediction proved to be true and cites 
Russia’s restoration of copyright for American authors as proof. Brief for the Respondents, 
supra note 16, at 51. 
 79. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1084–85. 
 80. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997)). 
 81. Id. at 1091. 
 82. Id. at 1092. 
 83. Id. at 1094. 
 84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011). 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Congress’s Power under the Copyright Clause 
1. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners have three main arguments. First, that Section 514 
violates the “limited Times” constraint. Second, that Section 514 is 
inconsistent with the language of the preamble. And finally, that the 
history of the Copyright Clause demonstrates that Congress cannot 
remove works from the public domain. 
Petitioners first argue that Section 514 violates the Copyright 
Clause’s requirement that copyright protection be granted for only 
“limited Times.”85 They assert that authorizing Congress to remove 
works from the public domain would render the limited times 
requirement meaningless by allowing copyright to be “resurrected at 
any time, even after it expires.”86 Petitioners distinguish this case from 
Eldred by stating that although an extended copyright term may still 
be limited by a definitive outer boundary, that is not the case here.87 
They argue that for the copyright term to be “limited,” the entry of a 
work into the public domain must signal “the end of protection, not 
an intermission.”88 
Petitioners’ second argument asserts that Section 514 contravenes 
the preamble of the Copyright Clause, which states that copyright 
must “promote the Progress of Science.”89 Petitioners argue that by 
allowing Congress to restore copyright to foreign works, the Court 
would not only destroy Petitioners’ reliance interests, but would set 
precedent that would interfere with the public’s ability to rely on 
public domain works in the future.90 This uncertainty would 
undermine the progress the Copyright Clause seeks to promote.91 In 
addition, by restricting the public’s ability to use previously available 
works, Section 514 impoverishes the public domain of material that 
was being used to spur the creation of further artistic works.92 Section 
514 makes these sacrifices in order to grant protection to works that 
 
 85. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 22. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. Id. at 22. 
 88. Id. at 23. 
 89. Id. at 24. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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have long been in existence and thus does not encourage the creation 
of new works.93 
Finally, Petitioners argue that the history of copyright confirms 
that Congress cannot take works out of the public domain.94 
According to Petitioners, Congress has amended the Copyright Act 
nineteen times and each time has made sure to preserve the contents 
of the public domain.95 Petitioners contend that any exceptions to this 
rule were the result of unusual circumstances, like war or the 
correction of legal errors.96 Although the Eldred Court looked to 
historical practice in upholding the CTEA, Petitioners argue that in 
this case tradition compels the opposite result—a finding of 
unconstitutionality.97 
2. The Government’s Arguments 
The Government asserts three arguments in response. First, that 
“limited Times” does not mean that the copyright term is inalterable. 
Second, that the preamble is not an independent limitation on 
Congress’s copyright powers. And third, that history demonstrates 
that Congress has granted retroactive copyrights on numerous 
occasions in the past. 
The Government emphasizes the Eldred Court’s finding that 
“limited Times” does not require a “fixed” or “inalterable” expiration 
date.98 Because the copyrights restored by Section 514 will still expire 
on the same date they would have expired had the works never 
entered the public domain, the Government argues that Section 514 is 
consistent with the limited times requirement. 
In response to Petitioners’ claim that the preamble is an 
independent limitation on Congress’s powers, the Government 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 20. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 
(2003) (stating that “[t]he rights of a . . . copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted 
bargain,’ under which, once the . . . copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . . 
work at will and without attribution” (internal citations omitted)). 
 95. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31. 
 96. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 9–11, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Aug. 31, 
2011). In their brief, Petitioners argue that the only instances in which Congress deviated from 
its traditional practice of preserving the public domain were (1) to allow foreign authors more 
time to register their works when World War I and World War II made it difficult for them to 
do so, and (2) to correct inadvertent errors on the part of the applicant or the Copyright Office. 
Id. 
 97. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31. 
 98. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 28. 
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stresses that no court has ever interpreted it in this way.99 Instead, the 
Government argues that under Eldred, the Copyright Clause 
empowers Congress, not the judiciary, to determine what balance is 
appropriate to “promote the Progress of Science.”100 
Lastly, the Government refutes Petitioners’ argument that 
historical practice suggests any limitation on Congress’s power to 
remove works from the public domain. According to the Government, 
the Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyright to many existing works 
that did not qualify for protection under state laws or the common 
law.101 Because state law and common law were the only forms of 
copyright protection prior to the Copyright Act of 1790, the 
Government contends that the First Congress believed that removing 
works from the public domain was constitutional.102 The Government 
also points to various occasions on which Congress restored copyright 
and patent protection to individual works and inventions, as well as to 
copyright-restoring laws passed during World Wars I and II to allow 
authors more time to register their works given the exigencies of 
war.103 The Government therefore argues that history demonstrates 
that removing works from the public domain is within the scope of 
Congress’s powers.104 
B. Whether Section 514 Violates the First Amendment 
1. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners argue that Section 514 should be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny because it alters the traditional contours of 
copyright. They then argue that Section 514 fails intermediate scrutiny 
either because none of Congress’s interests reach the level of an 
important government interest or because Section 514 burdens more 
speech than necessary to achieve those interests. 
Petitioners assert that under Eldred, Section 514 should be subject 
to First Amendment scrutiny because it alters the traditional contours 
of copyright by violating the time-honored principle that works in the 
 
 99. Id. at 16. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 20–21.  
 102. Id. at 21. 
 103. Id. at 24, 26 (citing the Act of Feb. 19, 1849 (Corson Act), ch. 57, 9 Stat. 763; Act of 
June 23, 1874 (Helmuth Act), ch. 534, 18 Stat. 618; Act of Feb. 17, 1898 (Jones Act), ch. 29, 30 
Stat. 1396; Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559; Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 215, 27 Stat. 743). 
 104. Id. at 23. 
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public domain remain there.105 They argue that the two built-in free 
speech safeguards that the Supreme Court identified in Eldred106 are 
inadequate to protect their First Amendment rights in this case. While 
the public may use the entirety of public domain works and may 
harvest both the ideas and expression of those works, the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense only allow for limited 
use of copyrighted works.107 As a result, Section 514 must be subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny.108 
Petitioners then contend that Section 514 fails intermediate 
scrutiny under the First Amendment.109 They deny that any of the 
Government’s stated interests rise to the level of an important 
government interest.110 Petitioners argue that granting foreign authors 
copyright in public domain works is, at best, an indirect means of 
protecting the rights of American authors, and that Congress based its 
predictions on insufficient evidence.111 
In response to the Government’s stated interest in complying with 
the Berne Convention, Petitioners assert that the United States could 
have done so without removing any works from the public domain.112 
Petitioners state that in 1988, when the United States joined the 
Berne Convention, Congress determined that the United States could 
comply with the Convention’s requirements without restoring any 
copyrights.113 Petitioners believe that the present Congress should 
abide by that determination. In the alternative, Petitioners argue that 
even if Berne does require the United States to restore copyright in 
foreign works, Section 514 burdens substantially more speech than 
necessary.114 Petitioners maintain that Article 18 allows Congress 
significant discretion. They assert that under Article 18, the United 
States can negotiate agreements excepting it from the restoration 
requirement or, alternatively, can pass laws providing for the 
permanent protection of reliance parties.115 Petitioners also assert that 
 
 105. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 43. 
 106. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (explaining that the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use are “built-in First Amendment accommodations”). 
 107. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 46–47. 
 108. Id. at 47. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 48. 
 111. Id. at 49–50. 
 112. Id. at 52. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 54. 
 115. Id. at 55–56. 
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Congress could have limited the copyright term for restored works to 
whichever copyright period is shorter: the period in the nation in 
which the work was created or the period in the United States.116 
2. The Government’s Arguments 
The Government argues that Section 514 does not alter the 
traditional contours of copyright protection.117 It maintains that the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense are the only features 
of copyright law that the Eldred Court referred to as “traditional 
contours.”118 Because both the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair 
use defense are preserved under Section 514, no First Amendment 
scrutiny is necessary.119 
If, however, the Court finds that Section 514 is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, the Government maintains that it would satisfy 
such review.120 The Government asserts that important governmental 
interests motivated the passage of Section 514. Specifically, Congress’s 
goal was not only to protect American authors’ copyrights abroad, but 
to secure them the specific protections it gave to foreign authors in 
Section 514.121 In addition to being in actual compliance with the 
Berne Convention, the Government contends that it is essential that 
other member nations perceive the United States as honoring the 
spirit of Berne’s terms because of the World Trade Organization 
dispute resolution provided for in TRIPs.122 Even if the Court 
disagrees with these assessments, the Government argues that 
because Congress is owed substantial deference in matters of 
predictive judgments and foreign affairs, the Court should not second-
guess the legislature’s decisions.123 
The Government then argues that Section 514 does not burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve Congress’s 
interests.124 It maintains that the methods of compliance Petitioners 
propose would undermine foreign nations’ perception that the United 
States is in compliance with Berne and make the United States 
 
 116. Id. at 59–60. 
 117. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 37. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 37–38. 
 120. Id. at 42. 
 121. Id. at 52. 
 122. Id. at 44. 
 123. Id. at 42–43. 
 124. Id. at 49. 
FONG COMMENTARY 11.18.11 V.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2011  11:26 AM 
2011] CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 15 
vulnerable to trade sanctions.125 It also rejects these alternatives126 
because Section 514 was written under the assumption that other 
countries would reciprocate the specific scope and extent of restored 
copyright protections.127 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court is likely to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
and uphold the constitutionality of Section 514. This result would be 
consistent with Eldred and other recent cases construing Congress’s 
power to enact copyright statutes, all of which suggest that the 
judiciary is incredibly deferential to Congress’s policy judgments in 
this area. Finding Section 514 unconstitutional, however, would be the 
better outcome, both in terms of ensuring that the boundaries of 
copyright law remain intact and in terms of adopting a policy that will 
promote the creation of new works. 
Because Petitioners’ arguments under the Copyright Clause are 
reminiscent of those made by the petitioners in Eldred, the Court is 
unlikely to find them convincing. The Court is likely, however, to 
reach a First Amendment analysis. Though the Government has 
managed to muster up some historical evidence of retroactive 
copyright grants, that historical evidence is exceptional enough for the 
Court to find that Section 514 alters copyright’s traditional contours. 
Still, the Court is unlikely to find that Congress transgressed the 
bounds of the discretion it is entitled under intermediate scrutiny. 
Though the arguments raised by Petitioners under the Copyright 
Clause seem more compelling in this case than in Eldred, their 
preambular argument probably is precluded by that Court’s holding. 
In Eldred, the Court conceded that promoting the progress of 
knowledge is the “primary objective of copyright.”128 It rejected the 
argument, however, that the CTEA ran contrary to that objective 
because it is for Congress, not the courts, to determine what 
intellectual property regime will best achieve the “promote the 
 
 125. Id. at 47–48. 
 126. See supra Part V.B.1. (stating Petitioners’ arguments that Congress could have (i) 
contracted around the Berne Convention’s requirements by making agreements with other 
nations, (ii) provided for permanent protection of reliance parties, or (iii) limited copyright 
protection to the shorter copyright period, whether that be the term in the United States or the 
term in the country of origin). 
 127. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 52. 
 128. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)). 
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Progress” aim.129 In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he profit motive 
is the engine that ensures the progress” of knowledge.130 In Golan, 
therefore, the Court is unlikely to perceive the additional rights 
Section 514 grants to foreign authors as being given at the expense of 
the American public. 
If, however, the Court upholds Section 514, the preamble would 
be rendered inconsequential. It is inconceivable how Section 514’s 
restoration of copyright could possibly “promote the Progress.” The 
works protected by Section 514 were not only already created, but by 
removing them from the public domain, Congress stifled any further 
“Progress” they could have promoted. In addition, the statute 
threatens the future integrity of the public domain in a way that 
discourages others from using it to create new works in the future. If 
Congress is constitutionally permitted to remove works from the 
public domain, the public may be uncomfortable relying on these 
works.131 This defeats the purpose of the public domain and the entire 
copyright regime. Section 514 not only fails to “promote the Progress 
of Science,” but also eradicates progress that has already occurred. By 
threatening the integrity of the public domain, it severely impedes 
future progress. Though strengthening copyright holders’ rights can 
arguably serve to “promote the Progress” by encouraging authors to 
put more effort into their works, that is not true in this case—the 
works at issue under Section 514 are works that already exist. 
The limited times argument will be a more difficult issue for the 
Court because the Eldred Court assigned great weight to Congress’s 
unbroken practice of retroactively extending the copyrights of 
existing works.132 Here, the historical pattern is less clear and the 
parties offer conflicting accounts of the historical record.133 However, 
the Government’s historical arguments—that the First Congress 
restored copyrights with the Copyright Act of 1790 and that early 
Congresses restored copyright and patent protection to individual 
works and inventions that had entered the public domain—may be 
 
 129. Id. at 212–13. 
 130. Id. at 212 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
 131. Brief of Public Domain Interests as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 28–37, 
Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 20, 2011). 
 132. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200–01, 209–10, 213.  
 133. Compare Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 31–41 (arguing that history 
demonstrates an unbroken congressional practice of preserving the public domain), with Brief 
for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 18–32 (arguing that history proves that Congress has 
removed works from the public domain in the past).  
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significant to the Court. The Court may be persuaded by the 
Government’s argument because of its affinity for such historical 
evidence.134 Still, relying too heavily on this evidence would be a 
mistake. If removing works from the public domain is not 
unprecedented, it is at least unusual.135 And even if the Court accepts 
the Government’s argument that Congress has established a historical 
practice of removing works from the public domain, “no one acquires 
a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long 
use, even when that span of time covers our entire national 
existence.”136 
To the extent the Court engages in a textual interpretation of the 
Copyright Clause, it is likely to rule in the Government’s favor. In 
Eldred, the Court stated that “limited” did not mean “fixed” or 
“inalterable”;137 instead, it noted that an extended term still had a 
definite expiration date.138 Similarly, the copyright term for restored 
works is still limited to the term that would have applied had the 
works not fallen out of copyright.139 This is likely to satisfy the Court’s 
definition of “limited.” It seems clear, however, that Section 514 does 
in fact cross constitutional boundaries. If Congress can retroactively 
restore copyright to works in the public domain, it is difficult to 
imagine what it cannot do. Construing “limited Times” in this way 
would rob the phrase of any meaning.140 
Though the Court is unlikely to find merit in Petitioners’ 
Copyright Clause arguments, it is likely to reach the First Amendment 
analysis. If it does, this will be the first time the Court has done so in 
the copyright context.141 Petitioners’ First Amendment claims, 
however, are unlikely to prevail. Though they may succeed in 
 
 134. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201–03 (finding it “significant” that early Congresses extended 
the duration of numerous individual patents and copyrights). 
 135. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192 (2007) (“[O]ur examination of the history of 
American copyright law reveals that removal [of works from the public domain] was the 
exception rather than the rule.”). 
 136. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 
664, 678 (1970)). 
 137. Id. at 199. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
 140. Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan 
v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 144–45 (2011) (stating that the “limited Times” 
restriction in the Copyright Clause “will be rendered a dead letter” if Congress can restore 
copyrights). 
 141. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (discussing how “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards 
are generally adequate to address [First Amendment concerns]” in the copyright area). 
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convincing the Court that First Amendment review is warranted, they 
are unlikely to persuade it that Congress’s actions should fail 
intermediate scrutiny. 
Under Eldred, Petitioners must prove that Section 514 alters the 
“traditional contours of copyright protection” in order to obtain First 
Amendment scrutiny.142 Unfortunately, the Eldred Court did not 
clarify exactly what it meant by copyright’s “traditional contours.” 
Because Eldred depended on the belief that the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment are inherently compatible,143 whether the 
Supreme Court agrees with Petitioners’ or the Government’s 
interpretation will depend on what aspects of copyright it considers 
fundamental to copyright’s free speech compatibility. The history of 
copyright is also likely to weigh heavily in its analysis.144 Though it 
seems clear that the Court’s definition of “traditional contours” will 
encompass more than the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
exception,145 it is less obvious that the integrity of the entire contents 
of the public domain will make the Court’s list. As mentioned 
previously, the historical record is not wholly supportive of the 
proposition that Congress has never removed works from the public 
domain.146 However, because Petitioners were previously able to make 
unrestricted use of the entirety of the newly restored works and must 
now pay to do so, Section 514 burdens their speech in a way that 
cannot be rectified by the idea/expression dichotomy or fair use 
exception, neither of which allow for completely unrestricted use of 
those works.147 
Even if the Court finds that Section 514 has altered the 
“traditional contours of copyright protection,” the statute is unlikely 
to be struck down. Because the parties agree that Section 514 is 
content-neutral, it will be subject to intermediate scrutiny.148 The 
Supreme Court is almost certain to find the avoidance of trade 
sanctions and the protection of American authors’ rights abroad to be 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Eldred Court's use 
of the word ‘traditional’ to modify ‘contours’ suggests that Congress's historical practice with 
respect to copyright and the public domain must inform our inquiry.”). 
 145. For example, because it is constitutionally required, the originality requirement 
certainly qualifies as a traditional contour of copyright protection. 
 146. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 16, at 18–31. 
 147. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1194–95. 
 148. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that content-neutral 
speech receives intermediate scrutiny). 
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important government interests.149 The question of whether the statute 
burdens substantially more speech than necessary is more difficult. To 
satisfy this standard, a statute need not be the least-restrictive means 
of achieving the government’s stated interest.150 As a result, the 
existence of less burdensome alternatives is not dispositive.151 Because 
this standard is somewhat flexible, the amount of legislative deference 
the Court believes is appropriate will be important in deciding the 
issue. As this is a complex matter concerning both the structure of the 
copyright regime and foreign relations, the Court is likely to defer 
substantially to Congress’s decision-making authority.152 Especially 
considering the concessions the statute makes to reliance parties,153 
the Court is unlikely to find that Congress went so far outside the 
scope of its discretion that it failed to tailor the statute narrowly 
enough to pass intermediate scrutiny.154 
Nevertheless, as Petitioners argue in their brief, by virtue of the 
United States signing the Berne Convention, American copyright 
holders were already guaranteed protection for their new works in all 
member nations.155 Though it may not have been ideal that they 
lacked protection for their previously created works, this problem 
would have solved itself with time because those works eventually 
would have fallen into the public domain. By contrast, setting a 
precedent that would allow Congress to remove works from the 
public domain and restore them to copyright at any time in the future 
would seriously undermine the integrity of the public domain in a way 
that could permanently stifle its use by the public.156 
 
 149. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (stating that in assessing 
the importance of the government’s interest and whether the challenged statute addresses and 
alleviates a real harm, Congress is entitled to “substantial” deference). 
 150. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d at 1092. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause empowers 
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, 
will serve the ends of the Clause . . . . The wisdom of Congress’ action [] is not within our 
province to second-guess.” (emphasis added)); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363, 386 (2000) (“We have . . . consistently acknowledged that the ‘nuances’ of the 
foreign policy of the United States . . . are much more the province of the Executive Branch and 
Congress than of this Court.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 153. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A (West 1994). 
 154. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 213 (“Content-neutral regulations do not pose 
the same inherent dangers to free expression that content-based regulations do, and thus are 
subject to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government latitude in designing a 
regulatory solution.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 155. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 52. 
 156. Brief of Public Domain Interests as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 
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While international harmonization and robust foreign trade are 
important, the effect of those goals on the United States’s copyright 
framework must be limited.157 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Golan v. 
Holder is replete with concerns about trade, but lacking in copyright 
considerations.158 The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment 
were fashioned to protect important interests. Those interests and the 
demands of the Constitution cannot be so easily brushed aside in the 
pursuit of trade. 
 
 
131, at 39–40. 
 157. Gard, Copyright Law v. Trade Policy: Understanding the Golan Battle Within the Tenth 
Circuit, supra note 16, at 189. 
 158. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1085–89 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing testimony on 
the importance of Section 514 to American interests in foreign countries). 
